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Of availability, targeting and accessibility: online
copyright infringements and jurisdiction in the EU
Sari Depreeuw and Jean-Benoı̂t Hubin*
Introduction
It has never been easier to share information with the
whole world than in our current ‘information society’. We
have websites, blogs, peer-to-peer networks and social net-
working sites that allow us to post, share or stream any-
thing we can come up with and impart it to a worldwide
public. It goes without saying that much of this content is
subject to exclusive rights, and that consent of authors,
performers, publishers or producers is not always sought.
When relevant rightholders want to counteract behaviours
that they consider infringing, they may face complicated
questions due to the cross-border effects that their actions
may have. An international news site, for example, may
offer information that appeals to citizens in different parts
of the world, while an online music streaming website
with a Hungarian interface may be accessible in Hungary
and in Portugal but will attract mainly a Hungarian
public. When one of those services allegedly infringes
copyright, the rightholder has several options for taking
legal action when ‘extraneous’ or ‘foreign’ elements are
present. For instance, when the person making the work
accessible is located in a different country from the
persons accessing it, and these visitors are not necessarily
concentrated in the territory of one single country either,
questions of ‘private international law’—in particular jur-
isdiction and applicable law—arise.
In this article we will focus on questions such as what
courts have jurisdiction in the event of an alleged infringe-
ment with cross-border effects, and how far their jurisdic-
tion extends. We will not treat the question of the
applicable law on this occasion, although it may be a puz-
zling issue. Copyright law is not entirely harmonized at the
EU level, and important differences remain between EU
Member States: a certain behaviour may constitute an in-
fringement in one Member State, but may be non-
infringing under the law of another Member State. Hence
the interest in having one law applied rather than another.
First, we will examine what exclusive rights may be
involved and how they are localized in the EU Member
States. We will then determine whether and how the
localization criteria affect the jurisdiction of national
* The authors wish to thank Jean-Paul Trialle and Mitchell Selie for their
contribution to this article. Emails: sari.depreeuw@dewolf-law.be and
jeanbenoit.hubin@dewolf-law.be.
1 The Study is available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/
studies/index_en.htm (last accessed 9 July 2014).
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courts. We will see that both legal issues have their own
rules that apply autonomously, but their relation will be
examined in this article.
National territoriality of copyright and
the localisation of protected acts
One of the key features of copyright is its national char-
acter.2 International protection of literary and artistic
works is indeed organized on the basis of national laws
rather than a universal copyright law. The Berne Con-
vention created a ‘bundle’ of national protections for the
authors who qualify for protection. It thus operates a
two-tier approach: it defines a minimum level of protec-
tion (harmonization) and guarantees that foreign authors
can rely on national copyright protection in other states of
the Berne Union (national treatment).3 This system was
sufficient when it was first adopted and the exploitation of
works was largely organized per national territory.
The same principles apply at the EU level: copyright
protection is harmonized to a great extent, but it is
granted by the Member States at the national level in the
first place.4 Protection is in principle limited to the terri-
tory of that Member State, so the right holder can only
rely on his/her exclusive right against acts that take place
on that territory.5 Important divergences remain bet-
ween the national copyright laws, so it matters where an
act protected under copyright is localized. While the
rights of reproduction, distribution and communication
to the public (including making available to the public)
are fairly well harmonized, this is much less the case for
the exceptions granted by Member States. Rightholders,
intermediaries and end users may consequently have an
interest in localising their acts in a certain Member State
rather than another one.
Before examining in which countries legal action can
be brought (jurisdiction), we will verify where the acts
protected under copyright are localized.
Localization criteria in EU copyright
With the increase of cross-border traffic, especially since
the development of the Internet, it is not so straightfor-
ward to narrow down the acts of exploitation to one
country. In the largely analogue era, an act of reproduc-
tion took place in the country where the copy was made.
Little confusion existed on this point: the person who
made the copy, the equipment for making the copy and
the copy were all in the same place.6 The same was true
for public performances and local broadcasts that were
mostly confined to the territory of one country (except
for some incidental spill-over around the borders to the
neighbouring country). With the adoption of structural-
ly cross-border technologies, the question has become
more pressing. Satellite broadcasts, for example, are
meant to be received in all the countries within a certain
reception zone: their so-called footprint covers several
countries by design. The question is then whether the
work is communicated to the public in the country of
emission, the countries of reception or both in the
country of emission and the countries of reception.7 In
the former situation, the broadcaster would only have to
clear the rights in the country of emission, while in the
two latter cases the consent of the rightholders would be
required in all countries of the footprint. In Europe, the
uncertainty was resolved in the Satellite and Cable Dir-
ective,8 which explicitly states, in Article 1(2)(b), that
the satellite broadcast only takes place in the Member
State where the programme-carrying signals are intro-
duced into an uninterrupted chain of communication
leading to the satellite and down towards the earth. This
‘country of origin’ principle entails that the broadcaster
does not have to clear the rights in each Member State of
reception.
Other directives that harmonized copyright in the EU
do not explicitly define a localization criterion. The In-
formation Society Directive,9 for example, harmonized
the reproduction right and the right of communication
2 On this topic, see PB Hugenholtz ‘The Last Frontier: Territoriality’ in M
van Eechoud et al (eds), Harmonizing European Copyright Law: The
Challenges of Better Lawmaking (Kluwer Law International 2009), available
at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/eechoud/Harmonizing_European_
Copyright_Law_chap9.pdf (last accessed 9 July 2014); A Peukert
‘Territoriality and Extraterritoriality in Intellectual Property Law’ in G
Handl and J Zekoll (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal
Authority In An Age Of Globalization (Brill Academic Publishing 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1592263 (last accessed 9 July 2014).
3 JC Ginsburg ‘Berne Without Borders: Geographic Indiscretion and Digital
Communications’, Stephen Stewart Memorial Lecture, Intellectual
Property Institute, London, UK, 29 October 29, 2001 (2001), Columbia
Law School, Pub Law Research Paper No. 01-30. Available at SSRN: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=292010 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.292010.
4 The CJEU has confirmed this in several decisions, eg Judgment in
Lagardère Active Broadcast, C-192/04, EU:C:2005:475; Judgment in Football
Dataco and others C-173/11, EU:C:2012:642.
5 With regard to database rights, see Judgment in Football Dataco, above, n 4,
para 27.
6 A complicating factor could be that the copy was made at the request and
on behalf of another person and that these two people were not present at
the same place. Moreover, national laws differed on whom should be
considered responsible for the copy: the person actually making the copy
or the person on whose behalf it was made.
7 This interpretation is known as the Bogsch theory. See W Dillenz ‘La
protection juridique des oeuvres transmises par satellites de radiodiffusion
directe’ (1986) Le droit d’auteur, 1986, 346.
8 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of
certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, OJ L 248/15
(Satellite and Cable Directive).
9 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related
rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10.
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to the public, including the making available right, but it
did not determine in which Member States such acts
would take place in case of cross-border exploitations.
Yet this directive was adopted to make sure that the na-
tional copyright laws would be fit for technical develop-
ments, in particular Internet technologies.10 Similarly,
copies of protected works are commonly distributed
across borders, but it is not indicated where acts of
import or export protected under the distribution right
should take place.
Different criteria could be used to tie cross-border ex-
ploitation to the territory of one or several Member
States: accessibility, exploitation, material acts. Where
protected subject matter is offered for streaming on a
website,11 some may hold the opinion that a distinct act
of communication to the public is performed in every
country where the website is accessible. By default,
content on a website is accessible worldwide, so that the
rights should be cleared for every country where the
public can access the content, even if realistically they are
not going to. For example, an online music streaming
service with a Hungarian interface, for example written
in the Hungarian language with prices expressed in Hun-
garian Forint, will mainly attract a Hungarian audience;
but if it is also accessible in Portugal, it makes the works
available in Portugal, and thus requires that rights be
cleared in Portugal. The only way to restrict the geo-
graphical scope of the licence or to prevent infringement,
is then to apply technical measures to restrict the service
to some countries (geo-blocking). Others consider such
interpretation excessive and find that acts of communica-
tion to the public only occur in the countries where an
act of exploitation can be established. On this view, it
matters little that a Hungarian streaming service is ac-
cessible in Portugal: if the public in Portugal is not tar-
geted by the service provider, the exploitation only takes
place in Hungary (where its audience resides). As such,
the work is only communicated to the public in Hungary
and should be authorized there (not in Portugal). Alter-
natively, relevant acts of communication to the public
may be found in those countries where a material act
constitutive of the technical process is performed, for
example upload to the server, transmitting, receiving the
work.
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
has considered several cases involving acts protected
under copyright (or other laws). We will first discuss
two cases in the field of copyright (Lagardère and
Donner), and then examine three decisions in which the
court localized certain acts that had taken place via
the Internet (Pammer and Alpenhof, L0Oréal v eBay and
Sportradar).
The issue of interest in Lagardère12 was whether acts
of broadcasting by the television station Europe 1, direc-
ted to the French public, took place in Germany, where
Lagardère had a ground station. Lagardère had indeed
set up a complex technical system to make sure its
broadcasts were received in the entire French territory,
including the border areas. It sent the programmes by
satellite to ground stations in France and Germany, and
from there the television programmes were broadcast via
Hertz waves. The programmes were mainly meant for
the French public (the programmes were in French, the
broadcast could be captured mainly in France and the
advertisement slots were offered to French advertisers),
but they could also be captured on the German side of
the border, where a ground station was located. This led
a German collecting society to claim that an act of
broadcasting took place in Germany and that, conse-
quently, the equitable single remuneration for perfor-
mers and producers was due in Germany (Art 8 of
Rental and Lending Directive13), in addition to the re-
muneration paid in France.
Having excluded the application of the country of
origin principle provided by the Satellite and Cable
Directive for acts of communication to the public via
satellite, the court decided that such acts could be
located in France and Germany, and that payment was
due. The territoriality principle led to the conclusion
that Member States can only regulate activities that
occur on their territories.14 Since Lagardère performed
the material acts of broadcasting in France and Germany
through terrestrial transmitters located in France and
Germany, the national copyright laws of those countries
10 This was agreed in the WIPO framework, in particular the 1996 WIPO
Copyright Treaty. See Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament
and Council Directive on the harmonization of certain aspects of copyright
and related rights in the Information Society, COM(97)0628, OJ C 108, 7
April 1997, 25; S von Lewinski and MM Walter ‘Information Society
Directive’ in MM Walter and S von Lewinski (eds), European Copyright
Law A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2010) 973; S Bechtold,
‘Information Society Dir.’ in T Dreier and PB Hugenholtz (eds), Concise
European Copyright Law (Kluwer Law International 2006), 360.
11 On that issue, see E. Treppoz, ‘Droit européen de la propriété intellectuelle’
(2011) RTDE 853 ;J-P Moiny, ‘Droit international et droit européen -
“l’intention géodéterminée” : un facteur de rattachement confirmé?’ (2012)
RDTI 217.
12 Judgment in Lagardère Active Broadcast, above, n 4.
13 Directive 2006/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2006 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights
related to copyright in the field of intellectual property (codified version),
OJ L 376/28.
14 Judgment in Lagardère Active Broadcast, above, n 4, para 46.
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should determine whether remuneration was due. The
amount of the equitable remuneration, by contrast,
should be determined taking into account all parameters
of the broadcast, ‘in particular, the actual audience, the
potential audience and the language version of the broad-
cast’15—criteria that refer to the commercial exploitation
in that territory. Logically, this meant that the remuner-
ation would be higher in France (where Lagardère was
established and where the exploitation value was higher
since the programmes in French could reach a greater actual
or potential French-speaking public) than in Germany
(where fewer people would be interested in programmes
in French).
In summary, the relevant act that triggered the appli-
cation of the national law (and the obligation to pay an
equitable remuneration) was the material act of trans-
mission from a ground station located in a Member
State. Subsequently the amount of the remuneration per
Member State should reflect the value of the exploitation
in that Member State in function of the actual or poten-
tial audience.
A different criterion was applied in the Donner case.16
The issue here was where, in case of a cross-border distri-
bution, the protected act takes place (Article 4(1)
InfoSoc Directive). Mr Donner, a German citizen, was
involved in a cross-border sales operation of replica fur-
niture set in Italy but serving the German market. More-
over, he directed his marketing efforts to the German
public and had organized a system for the payment for,
delivery and return of the goods in Germany. Since Italy
and Germany allowed a different level of protection for
goods such as furniture, it mattered to know whether
the goods were distributed in Germany, where Mr
Donner faced criminal prosecution.
The CJEU applied a different criterion than in Lagar-
dère and considered that an act of distribution had
indeed taken place in Germany, where the public was
targeted. The court found that an act of distribution
might encompass several acts, from the conclusion of
the (sale) contract to the delivery of the object to the re-
cipient. Where the transaction crosses State borders, the
distribution right may be infringed in a number of
Member States,17 in particular where the public is tar-
geted.18 The CJEU stated that ‘a trader who directs his
advertising at members of the public residing in a given
Member State and creates or makes available to them a
specific delivery system and payment method, or allows
a third party to do so, thereby enabling those members
of the public to receive delivery of copies of works
protected by copyright in that same Member State,
makes, in the Member State where the delivery takes
place, a distribution to the public’.19 Relevant factors for
finding such targeting activity in this case were the exist-
ence of a website in German, the content and the distri-
bution channels of advertising materials and a
cooperation with a freight forwarding company making
deliveries in Germany.
This ‘targeting’ criterion has been also applied to
online activities. In Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof,20 the
CJEU was asked to decide under what circumstances
commercial or professional activities are ‘directed to’ a
Member State where a consumer has his domicile.21 The
first case concerned a shipping company established in
Germany that had been brought before the Austrian
courts by a customer, Mr Pammer, who resided in Austria
and was not satisfied with a freighter voyage that he had
booked via an intermediary. The intermediary had adver-
tised the voyage via the Internet, and the freight company
had no commercial activity in Austria. The question sub-
mitted to the court was whether the circumstance that the
website of the intermediary could be consulted in Austria
meant that the trader’s activities were ‘directed at’ that
country. In the second case, the operator of a hotel in Aus-
tria had a dispute with a consumer residing in Germany
and brought legal proceedings against him before the Aus-
trian courts. The hotel operator argued that the Austrian
courts lacked jurisdiction because it did not pursue any
professional or commercial activity in Austria. The question
was whether the trader’s activity was ‘directed’ at the consu-
mer’s domicile when the hotel operator had a website
with general information and advertisement but without
the possibility directly to conclude a contract online (reser-
vations had to be made using the general information on
the site).
In both cases the question was whether a trader (oper-
ating via the Internet) ‘directed its activity to the Mem-
ber State of a consumer’s domicile’ in order to establish
jurisdiction on the basis of Article 15 of Regulation 44/
2001 of 22 December 2000, also known as Brussels I
Regulation.22 The court observed that an intention to
target a Member State is more easily derived when an ad-
vertisement is spread using some media (press, radio,
15 Ibid.
16 Judgment in Criminal proceedings against Titus Alexander Jochen Donner,
C-5/11, EU:C:2012:370.
17 Ibid., para 26.
18 Ibid., para 27.
19 Ibid.
20 Judgment in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, C-585/08 and C-144/09,
ECLI:EU:C:2010:740.
21 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters, OJ L12/1, Art 15 (‘Brussels I Regulation’).
22 Judgment in Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof, above, n 19, para 52.
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television, cinema, catalogues or offers in person) than
others, notably the Internet. The mere fact that an adver-
tisement on a website is accessible outside the Member
State where the trader has its establishment does not
entail that such content is directed to other Member
States. Instead, it should be ascertained whether the
trader has manifested its intention to establish com-
mercial relations with consumers in one or more other
Member States, including that of the consumer’s domi-
cile.23 The court provided a non-exhaustive list of
indicia in this respect: the international nature of the ac-
tivity; mention of itineraries from other Member States
for going to the place where the trader is established; use
of a language or a currency other than the language or
currency generally used in the Member State in which
the trader is established, with the possibility of making
and confirming the reservation in that other language;
mention of telephone numbers with an international
code; outlay of expenditure on an Internet-referencing
service in order to facilitate access to the trader’s site or
that of its intermediary by consumers domiciled in other
Member States; use of a top-level domain name other
than that of the Member State in which the trader is
established; and mention of an international clientele
composed of customers domiciled in various Member
States.24 By contrast, no such intention could be estab-
lished based on the mere accessibility of a website in the
Member State where the consumer resides, the mention
of an email address and other contact details, the use of
a language or a currency which are the language and/or
currency generally used in the Member State in which
the trader is established.25
The same criterion of ‘consumer targeting’ in some
territory was applied in L0Oréal v eBay,26 this time not in
order to establish jurisdiction but to determine whether
trade mark protection applied to goods offered online
for sale in the EU but originating outside the EU.
The CJEU decided that (Community or national)
trade mark protection applies ‘as soon as it is clear that
the offer for sale of a trade-marked product located in a
third State is targeted at consumers in the territory
covered by the trade mark’.27 Any other understanding
would undermine the effectiveness of trade mark protec-
tion in the EU: the owner of the trade mark would
not be able to oppose the unauthorized use of his/her
sign, directed at consumers in the EU, merely because
the person behind the offer or the advertisement, the
hosting server for the website or the product offered for
sale are established or located in a different country. It is
not, however, sufficient that the website is merely access-
ible from the territory covered by the trade mark: Add-
itional elements should be provided to establish the
‘targeting’. It is for the national court to assess ‘on a case-
by-case basis whether relevant factors exist, on the basis
of which it may be concluded that an offer for sale or an
advertisement displayed on an online marketplace ac-
cessible from the territory covered by the trade mark is
targeted at consumers in that territory’.28 Any details of
‘the geographic areas to which the seller is willing to dis-
patch the product’29 on the website where the offer to
sell is displayed are particularly important to assess
whether the public in the territory (in this case the EU)
are targeted.
In this case, goods were offered for sale via eBay using
the domain name www.ebay.co.uk. For the court, sup-
posedly deriving this from the geographical indication in
the domain name, this website appeared targeted at con-
sumers in the territory covered by the national and
Community trade marks, and the court concluded that
the offers for sale via this website were subject to EU pro-
tection of trade marks.
Finally, in Sportradar,30 the CJEU has decided where
acts of re-utilization of a database should be localized. At
stake was the protection of a database by means of a sui
generis right.31 The database was exploited via the Internet,
across several countries, so the question was whether such
use was an act of re-utilization and in which Member
State(s) the act took place.
The claimants organized football competitions in
England and Scotland and managed the exploitation of
the data relating to those matches via the ‘Football Live’
database. Sportradar was a German company that offered
(live) data on English football matches, inter alia, to
betting companies, which in turn aimed their services at
the UK market. End users who visited the betting com-
panies’ websites in the UK were guided to Sportradar’s
Betradar service. It was clear that Sportradar’s operations
spread over several Member States. Technically, in order to
provide its service, Sportradar uploaded data from the
protected database ‘Football Live’ to a server in Member
State ‘A’ and sent the data to users residing in another
Member State ‘B’ (at the request of those users), where the
23 Ibid., para 75.
24 Ibid., para 93.
25 Ibid., para 94.
26 Judgment in L’Oréal SA and others v eBay International AG and others,
C-324/09, EU:C:2011:474.
27 Ibid., para 61–62.
28 Ibid., para 67.
29 Ibid., para 65.
30 Judgment in Football Dataco, above, n 4.
31 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, OJ L 77-20.
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data would be stored in the computer memory and dis-
played on the screen. Football Dataco claimed that Spor-
tradar’s data services constituted an infringement of its
database rights in the Football Live database and brought
a legal action before the UK courts. The High Court par-
tially declined jurisdiction to state the primary liability
of Sportradar, established outside the UK. The Court of
Appeal referred a preliminary question to the Court of
Justice, not asking the CJEU directly to state whether the
UK courts had jurisdiction but to localize the protected
acts so the Court of Appeal could decide whether it had
jurisdiction.32
The Database Directive defines re-utilization as ‘any
form of making available to the public all or a substantial
part of the contents of a database by the distribution of
copies, by renting, by on-line or other forms of transmis-
sion’.33 The directive does not contain a criterion to lo-
calize this act on the territory of one or more Member
States.
The Advocate General held the opinion that the act of
sending information obtained from a protected database
to a user’s computer, upon his/her request, clearly was
an ‘act forming a necessary constituent part of a process
of making available to the public, which . . . constitutes a
re-utilisation’.34 The act of ‘sending’ was considered one
of the necessary component parts of the complex act
that is ‘re-utilization’.35 Then the Advocate General loca-
lized the re-utilization in both Member States ‘A’ and ‘B’.
Instead of locating the re-utilization in the countries
where the data were sent (country of emission) or where
they were received (country of reception), he applied the
‘intended target’ criterion that the CJEU had developed
in L0Oréal and Pammer and Hotel Alpenhof. The re-util-
ization would include a ‘sequential succession of a
number of acts, which having as their purpose the
“making available” of certain data via a networked and
multi-polar communication medium’,36 hence the place
of each of the acts needed to produce the result of the re-
utilization determined the place of that re-utilization, ie
the both in Member States ‘A’ and ‘B’.
The court followed the Advocate General’s Opinion
and qualified the sending of data at the user’s request as
an act of re-utilization, which covers an act ‘in which a
person sends, by means of his web server, to another
person’s computer, at that person’s request, data previ-
ously extracted from the content of a database protected
by the sui generis right. By such a sending, that data is
made available to a member of the public’.37 In order
to establish an infringement of the re-utilization right
under UK law, it must be ascertained whether the acts of
‘sending’ took place in the UK. The court stated that, as
in the definition itself, the localization of an act of re-
utilization should correspond to independent criteria of
EU law. Since a re-utilization may consist of successive
operations (including the placing online for the public
to consult the data via a website and the transmission of
the data to a member of the public), these relevant acts
may take place in several Member States.38 In line with
its previous decisions, the court stated, however, that
‘the mere fact that the website containing the data in
question is accessible in a particular national territory is
not a sufficient basis for concluding that the operator of
the website is performing an act of reutilisation caught
by the national law applicable in that territory concern-
ing protection by the sui generis right’.39 Instead, the lo-
calization of an act of re-utilization depends on the
intention of the person performing the act to target
users in that territory.40 In this case, this intention could
be demonstrated by the nature of the data (English foot-
ball matches), the contracts that Sportradar had with
betting services operating in the UK, the remuneration
scheme (access by UK users) and the language used that
was different from the language of the Member State
where Sportradar pursued its activities. Subject to this,
the referring court could localize the act of re-utilization
in the Member State where the user was present to
whose computer the data were transmitted, at his/her
request, for purpose of storage and display on screen, ie
Member State ‘B’.41 The court concluded that this act of
sending is localized—at least—in the Member State
‘where there is evidence from which it may be concluded
that the act discloses an intention on the part of the
person performing the act to target members of the
public in [that Member State]’.42
In summary, the Advocate General and the court
applied the same criteria to localize the protected acts of
re-utilization (sending the data following an individual
request) but to different results. The database was re-
32 Court of Appeal 6 February 2013, case Nos A3/2012/1349, 1352, 1354 and
1366 [2013] EWCA Civ 27. Available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/
EWCA/Civ/2013/27.html.
33 Database Directive, Art 7(2)(b).
34 Opinion of Advocate-General P Cruz Villalón in Football Dataco, C-173/11,
EU:C:2012:377, para 41.
35 Ibid., para 42, 47.
36 Ibid., para 59.
37 Judgment in Football Dataco, above, n 4, para 20–21.
38 Ibid., para 34.
39 Ibid., para 36.
40 Ibid., para 39.
41 Ibid., para 43.
42 Ibid., para 47.
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utilized in the Member State where the public was targeted
and the mere accessibility of the database was not suffi-
cient to establish such targeting intention. This led the
Advocate General to place the act of re-utilization in the
Member States where the data were stored on a server
and where the end-user received the data, transmitted to
him/her at his/her request. The court left this issue open
and decided that the act of re-utilization was ‘at least’ loca-
lized in the Member State of destination, provided that
there was evidence of an intention to target the public res-
iding in that Member State (and possibly other Member
States).
Based on the case law discussed above, two principles
appear to have guided the CJEU. First, the principle of
national territoriality continues to apply to copyright,
despite extensive harmonization efforts. Rightholders
enjoy the protection of a national copyright law if a mater-
ial act can be tied to a particular Member State. Where a
work is transmitted across borders, it is not excluded that
the copyright laws of several Member States apply to the
same operation, except in the context of acts of communi-
cation to the public by satellite, for which the Satellite and
Cable Directive specifically opts for the application of the
copyright law of the Member State where the programme-
carrying signals are introduced into an uninterrupted
chain of communication (‘country of origin’).
Secondly, in order to tie an act that spreads across
several countries to the territory of a particular Member
State (or several Member States), the court developed a
‘targeting’ criterion. The national judge is called to verify
whether under this criterion there are factual indications
that the operator of the act (distributor, trader, etc) had
the intention of targeting specifically the public of a
Member State. Such intention may be established
through a number of factors, but it is not sufficient that
a website is merely accessible in a Member State.
So far the court has not applied this criterion to the
making available right or the right of communication to
the public to online infringements. However, the deci-
sions rendered so far give reasons to assume that this
could be the case: the cross-border distribution (pro-
tected under copyright) of furniture has been localized
using this targeting criterion in Donner and in Sportra-
dar the re-utilization of a database (technically similar to
the making available of a work) was held to take place
(among others) in the Member State of targeting.
Localizing acts of online exploitation within
the EU
Having identified and described the principles applied in
EU copyright, we will try to apply these to two typical
forms of online exploitation: streaming (or the offer for
streaming) and downloading (or the offer for download).
Reducing both forms of exploitation to their most char-
acteristic features, we will treat as ‘streaming’ those forms
of exploitation where protected subject matter (eg music
or films) is transmitted by a content provider to an end
user in a way that allows the end user to access the subject
matter without possessing a permanent copy. When a
work is instead made available for download, the end user
receives a permanent copy of the subject matter over
which he/she has complete control and that allows him/
her to access the work whenever he/she wants without
having to request another transmission of the work from
the content provider (‘downstream copy’). In both cases,
the protected subject matter is hosted on a server from
which the files containing the film or the music are trans-
mitted to the end users (either by streaming or for down-
load). This copy is referred to as the ‘upstream copy’.
In order to qualify such exploitations in copyright
terms, it should be verified whether there are any acts of
reproduction or communication to the public (Arts 2
and 3 of the InfoSoc Directive). Without going into the
details and for the sake of this exercise of localizing
the restricted acts, it can be assumed that the application
of these exclusive rights leads to the following analysis.
When protected subject matter (such as music, film
or text and images on a website) is offered for streaming
or download to users, a copy is stored on a host server.
This upstream copy can be qualified as an act of repro-
duction. This copy also makes it technically possible to
offer that content to the public: whenever a member of
the public has access to the service, he/she can request
the transmission of the file containing the film or the
music. This availability can be qualified as an act of making
available to the public in such a way that members of the
public may access the work from a place and at a time indi-
vidually chosen by them. Finally, in order to receive and
consult the file, the end user will make some downstream
copies. When a work is streamed to the recipient, these
copies are not permanent: they allow the end user to see the
video or listen to the music but do not give him/her a per-
manent control over the file (many end users of course find
ways to make a permanent copy from the temporary
copies). In most Member States of the EU, such downstream
copies are qualified as ‘temporary reproductions’ and may
then be exempted as temporary acts of reproduction under
Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, which is the only man-
datory exception for EU Member States to implement into
their national laws. The situation is different for works
offered for download: an end user who downloads a work
generally makes a permanent copy on his/her device. Such
permanent copy cannot be exempted on the same basis, and
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consequently it requires the author’s consent unless another
exception applies, such as the exception for private use
within Article 5(2(b) of the InfoSoc Directive.
Whenever a work is offered for streaming or download,
we can thus identify three restricted acts: a reproduction
on the hosting server (upstream copy), an act of making
available to the public, and a reproduction at the end
user’s device (downstream copy).43 This leads us to the
question of where the reproductions and the act of
making available take place.
So far we have found no criteria in the EU acquis to
determine the localization of the upstream reproduction.
Logically the reproduction takes place where it is made,
ie in the country where the person making the copy is
located when he/she makes the copy. A reproduction
indeed does not imply any transfer or any directing ac-
tivity, which makes a targeting criterion unsuitable to be
applied to this exclusive right.
This is straightforward for all analogue copies: the
person making the copy and the copy are in the same
place (eg a photocopy). The Advocate General in Pinck-
ney considered that ‘infringements of the reproduction
right assume in principle a strictly territorial dimension’
and localized the reproduction in the country where the
pressing of the unauthorized CDs had occurred.44 He
added that extra-territorial effects could result from sub-
sequent acts of communication to the public or distribu-
tion, but not from the act of reproduction itself. This is
not so clear for copies made and stored at a distance,
copies made and saved in the cloud: the person making
the copy could be in Member State ‘A’, while the copy
might be hosted on servers in Member State ‘B’ (or even
outside the EU). Also, storage on a server is a continuing
situation, which means that the location of the copy
might change throughout its existence. Where should
such reproduction be localized? Arguably, it makes most
sense to localize the copy where the person was when she
made it or where she usually uses it. The territoriality
principle indeed allows a country to regulate behaviour
taking place on its territory, and the behaviour of the
person making the copy is probably more significant
than its physical storage. A professional content pro-
vider, such as an online music store, could be established
in Member State ‘A’ and save its music database in Mem-
ber State ‘B’. Based on where the copies of the works are
stored, the reproduction takes place in Member State ‘B’.
The music store provider, however, takes its commercial,
technical and legal decisions where it is established, ie in
Member State ‘A’. This may be a more significant country
to situate the copy than the country where the copy is
stored, which may be chosen for other reasons (such as
competitive hosting services, favourable tax conditions
or even a lower-level copyright protection). Similarly,
the downstream copy on the end user’s device could
be seen as a reproduction made in the country where
the end user was when he/she downloaded the copy on
his/her device (eg MP3 player, CD, phone, computer).
We assume that the downstream copies, following the
streaming of a file, are of a transient or incidental nature
and that they are exempted under the national equiva-
lent of Article 5(1) of the InfoSoc Directive. Other copies
should be either covered by a licence or exempted by an
exception/limitation under national copyright law. This
is precisely where the localization of the reproduction
shows its importance: the exceptions/limitations listed
in the InfoSoc Directive are implemented in the national
copyright laws in an uneven way: a certain act that may
be covered by a specific exception/limitation in one
Member State may not be in another one (one of the
most notorious examples being probably the private
copy exception). The end user has a clear interest in
knowing where his/her copy is made, since a copy made
without the rightholder’s consent could be exempted by
an exception/limitation in one country but infringing
the copyright law of another country. In many cases the
reproduction takes place in the country where the end
user has downloaded the file to his/her device. When
he/she downloads a copy to a remote server, he/she may
not even know where the copy is physically stored.
Arguably, it matters little in which country the hosting
servers are located, when the purpose of the law is to regu-
late the behaviour of the end user. It can be contended
that the reproduction is located in the country where the
end user makes and uses the copy. At the same time, the
work is also communicated to the public, more precisely
it is made available to the public and transmitted to any
user at his/her individual request. Several criteria could be
used to localize this protected act in one or several coun-
tries (country of emission, reception or target).
It seems unlikely that de lege lata the ‘country of
origin’ principle can be applied to the making available
right: it is provided in the Satellite and Cable Directive,
which can be considered a lex specialis that only deals
with the localization of satellite broadcasts. Instead, the
‘targeting’ criterion of the CJEU could be applied to the
making-available right. The CJEU has applied it to the dis-
43 Some Member States do not qualify the upstream copy and the availability
for transmission separately but rather as one act of making available to the
public. We will not go into this discussion here.
44 Opinion of Advocate-General Jääskinen in Pinckney, C-170/12,
EU:C:2013:400, para 25.
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tribution right under copyright and to several cases relating
to Internet communications, including one communica-
tion protected under the re-utilization right of protected
databases. These decisions give us good reasons to think
that the CJEU would not shy away from applying the
targeting criterion to the making-available right under
copyright.
In each specific case, it should then be verified whether
the content provider had the intention of targeting the
public of a given Member State. Elements could be found
in the advertisement of the service, its content, the lan-
guages used and the delivery methods. For example, an
online music service may offer new releases from inter-
national artists that are popular in all Member States, but
it may also present local artists with a large fan base in
their home State or playlists composed by a local festival
or national broadcasters. In our example, a content pro-
vider offers a Hungarian version of its online music store:
the interface is in Hungarian, subscriptions fees are stated
in Hungarian Forint, the cheapest package is funded by
advertisements in Hungarian and its home page features
playlists inspired by the Sziget festival in Budapest. Such
elements may be seen as indications that the content pro-
vider targets the Hungarian public, and consequently the
protected subject matter is made available to the public in
Hungary. Inversely, it can be derived that the subject
matter is not made available in other Member States,
even if the music service is accessible everywhere else.
Any user in Portugal may have the opportunity to listen
to the music via this service, but for obvious reasons most
may be unlikely to do so. The circumstance that some
members of the perhaps more significant community in a
city like Brussels, as the capital of Europe, continue to use
the Hungarian version of the music service while residing
in Belgium may not suffice either to establish that the
public in Belgium is targeted: these transmissions may be
seen as overspill into another country rather than active
and intentional targeting by the provider of the online
music store. The consequence of this exercise is that the
content provider is under the obligation to clear the
making available right from the persons and entities
holding the rights for Hungary (or rely on an exception in
the Hungarian copyright law) but not for the accessibility
in Portugal or Belgium.
While the targeting criterion is not too difficult to
apply in specific cases such as our previous example or
the cases before the CJEU, it may lead to more uncer-
tainty in case of services that are appealing to a broader
audience. For example, websites that offer international
news in a widely understood language (mostly English)
can raise the interest of the public in many Member
States and are not designed to select a territorially
defined public and exclude others.45 Similarly, websites
streaming popular sports games (such as football games
during the FIFA World Cup) will attract a lot of visitors,
regardless of the language of the commentaries.46 Such
websites do not ‘target’ the public of one Member State or
selected Member States. Arguably, these websites make the
works or other subject matter (eg articles, photographs,
images, videos) available in all the Member States where
they are accessible, and the making-available right needs
to be cleared for all these Member States. Moreover, when-
ever certain content is offered for download, the reproduc-
tion right should be cleared for the same territory.
One final observation must be made. While the inten-
tion to target the public in one Member State is certainly
likely to be a criterion for localizing the making available
of a work to the public of one or more Member States, it
is not excluded that other criteria apply. As the CJEU
stated in Sportradar, the protected act takes place at least
in the countries where the public is targeted. It is pos-
sible, then, that the act of making available takes place in
the targeted Member States and, for instance, in the
country of origin. This remains to be seen.
In summary, online exploitation of protected subject
matter can be analysed in copyright terms as involving
acts of reproduction and communication to the public,
in particular making available to the public. Most of the
time, such online exploitation entails acts in several
Member States, in particular in countries where the files
are hosted, where the content provider is established and
conducts its business, where the end users reside and
access the work and engage in copying activities.
Apart from a criterion for satellite broadcasts in the
Satellite and Cable Directive, the directives that consti-
tute the copyright acquis do not expressly provide any
localization criteria. In line with the decisions of the
CJEU, we have applied a targeting criterion to the
making-available right. Where no specific public is tar-
geted, the work is arguably made available to the public
that has access to the work. The targeting criterion can
hardly be applied to the reproduction right, so we have
45 Some newspapers, such as Der Spiegel, are traditionally published in the
language of one country (German) and offer an international version in
English, with a selection of their articles of most interest to the public
outside Germany.
46 Even if football games are not protected under copyright, the broadcast
may be protected by neighbouring rights (producer, broadcaster). See on
this point the CJEU’s decision in CJEU C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football
Association Premier League, NetMed Hellas, Multichoice Hellas c. QC
Leisure, David Richardson, AV Station, Malcolm Chamberlain, Michael
Madden, SR Leisure, Philip George Charles Houghton, Derek Owen; Karen
Murphy v. Media Protection Services, para 98.
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argued that this should be localized by reference to the
person making the copy, rather than a technical criterion
that verifies where the copies are stored but that has no
other significance for the exploitation of the protected
subject-matter. There is no absolute legal certainty
regarding the localization of the reproduction right and
other criteria (in addition to the targeting criterion) for
the making available right.
More legal certainty on the localization criteria would
be welcome. As the CJEU pointed out in Sportradar,
the localization of the acts may have an influence on
the questions of jurisdiction and applicable law.47 In the
next section, we will examine the rules of jurisdiction ap-
plicable to copyright infringements laid down in the reg-
ulations and in the decisions of the Court of Justice
(leaving aside the rules to determine the applicable law).
In the final section, we will apply these rules to online
exploitations and the rights of making available and re-
production localized as described.
Jurisdiction
Having determined where a copyright-protected act is
localized and an alleged infringement has occurred, the
copyright holder has to determine the country(ies) where
he/she will bring legal proceedings against the person(s)
allegedly liable for that infringement. The courts of a
certain Member State may only hear copyright infringe-
ment cases if, and to the extent that, the territory in which
they have jurisdiction is concerned.48 Hence, the principles
that help to localize copyright-protected acts have also an
impact on issues of jurisdiction, although the rules used to
determine jurisdiction are autonomous from localization
of the copyright-protected act. They are based on factual
localization criterion and apply independently from the
debate on the substance of protection,49 even if both issues
are related.50
In the present section, we will present the rules applic-
able to establish jurisdiction in the EU in the context of
an alleged copyright infringement. We will then focus on
the application of those principles to online acts of ex-
ploitation of protected works.
Rules on jurisdiction applicable to copyright
infringements
The principles on jurisdiction in civil and commercial
matters are determined by the Brussels I Regulation.51
Recital 11 to the Regulation states that the rules of juris-
diction must be highly predictable and founded on the
general principle that jurisdiction is based on the defen-
dant’s domicile. Article 2 therefore provides that the
claimant may always sue the defendant before the courts
of the Member State where the latter is domiciled.
In addition to the general rule of jurisdiction of
the defendant’s domicile, the Brussels I Regulation also
proposes alternative grounds of jurisdiction based
either on a close link between the court and the action
or the objective of facilitating the sound administration
of justice. One of these alternatives (Art 5(3)) gives jur-
isdiction to the courts of the Member State ‘where the
harmful event occurred or may occur’. That provision
applies in the context of copyright infringements and
justifies the competence of the courts of the Member
State where the infringing acts take place. This raises the
question where to localize the infringement in case of
complex acts, for example the making available to the
public that consist in several material acts and that may
be localized in different countries. The expression ‘[the]
place where the harmful event occurred’ may thus
appear unclear and result in a lack of legal certainty for
the rightholders and alleged infringers alike. Moreover,
in the context of cross-border exploitation of copyright-
protected works, a ‘harmful event’ may refer to the
event giving rise to an infringement or the resulting
damage, and these elements may occur in different
countries. In cases like these, the ‘harmful event’ rule
does not answer the question as to what elements have
to be taken into account as a connecting factor to deter-
mine jurisdiction.
For simple acts, such as a reproduction, the question
of jurisdiction may be fairly straightforward. This was
the view of Advocate General Jääskinen, who found that
the reproduction of a CD was made in the country
where the pressing was made, and that the infringement
of an author’s reproduction right did ‘not assume any
cross-border nature, since the place of the event giving
rise to the harm and the place where the harm occurred
are the same’.52 Interestingly, he added that the harm
occurs in the same place because it ‘is entirely brought
about by the sole fact of the carrying-out of the act of
reproduction’.53
Other copyright-protected acts, such as the right of
communication to the public or the distribution right,
are more likely to contain an extraneous element, which
47 Judgment in Football Dataco, above, n 4, para 29.
48 Opinion in Pinckney, above, n 42, para 25.
49 Judgment in Pinckney, C-170/12, EU:C:2013:635, para 41.
50 Opinion in Pinckney, above, n 42, para 45; E Treppoz, ‘Droit européen de la
propriété intellectuelle’ (2011) RTDE 847, 851.
51 Brussels I Regulation, above, n 20.
52 Opinion in Pinckney, above, n 42, para 53.
53 Ibid: opinion in Pinckney, para 53.
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entails that ‘the various elements of the alleged liability
are separate’, the connecting points are not the same and
‘the harm resulting from infringements of distribution
or communication rights assumes a potential addressee
or public, which may be in a different place from that
act’.54
We will now examine how the CJEU has interpreted
the concept of ‘place where the harmful event occurs’ in
Article 5(3) of the Brussels I Regulation. First, we will
recall the general interpretation provided in the Mines de
Potasse55 and Shevill56 decisions. Then, we will analyse
how the court has applied this criterion in the context of
online uses not relating to copyright in the judgments in
eDate Advertising57 and Wintersteiger. Finally, we will
focus on Pinckney and Hejduk58 in which the court was
asked to apply Article 5(3) in the context of online copy-
right infringements.
In its 1976 decision in Mines de Potasse the then
European Court of Justice was asked to guide the
national court in establishing jurisdiction in a case of
water pollution that had been allegedly caused in France
and had effects in The Netherlands. The court stated
that the wording “place where the harmful event oc-
curred” in Article 5(3) of the 1968 Brussels Convention
on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in
civil and commercial matters provides an option for the
plaintiff, faced with complex infringements, to start
proceedings either at the place where the damage occurs
or at the place of the event giving rise to it.59
The court confirmed that interpretation in Shevill.60
That case arose from the publication of a libellous news-
paper article in the United Kingdom and its distribution
in different Member States, causing damage to the indi-
vidual affected by that article in each country where
the newspaper was distributed. The court built further
on the Mines de Potasse principle, and distinguished
between the two criteria for jurisdiction (the event
giving rise to the damage or the place where the damage
occured) in terms of the scope of jurisdiction of the
courts seized. First, the victim/claimant has the option
of bringing his/her claim in the country of the event
giving rise to the damage, this being the country of pub-
lication. This court would have jurisdiction to decide on
the entire claim, ie the full amount of the damage suf-
fered. Secondly, the plaintiff can bring legal action in the
countries where the damage occurs, ie the countries
where the newspaper was distributed. The Court of
Justice, however, brought an important limitation to the
scope of jurisdiction of the courts of the countries where
the damage occurs: these courts would only be compe-
tent for the damage suffered in each respective country.
A judge seized on this basis cannot award compensation
for the entire damage, but only for the damage on his/
her territory.
The Court of Justice has recently applied the princi-
ples resulting from Mines de Potasse and Shevill to infrin-
ging acts committed over the Internet.
In eDate Advertising,61 the court dealt with online
publication of newspaper articles in breach of two indi-
viduals’ privacy. These publications caused damage to
these persons in many countries besides those where
the publishers of the article were located and where
the victims were domiciled. In its decision, the court
pointed out the specific issues relating to the Internet
and the difficulty to apply the existing case law relating
on Article 5(3). It considered that:
the placing online of content on a website is to be distin-
guished from the regional distribution of media such as
printed matter in that it is intended, in principle, to ensure
the ubiquity of that content. That content may be consulted
instantly by an unlimited number of internet users through-
out the world, irrespective of any intention on the part of
the person who placed it in regard to its consultation
beyond that person’s Member State of establishment and
outside of that person’s control. It thus appears that the
internet reduces the usefulness of the criterion relating to
distribution, in so far as the scope of the distribution of
content placed online is in principle universal. Moreover, it
is not always possible, on a technical level, to quantify that
distribution with certainty and accuracy in relation to a par-
ticular Member State or, therefore, to assess the damage
caused exclusively within that Member State.62
The court stressed the necessity of adapting the existing
criterion of the place where the damage occurs. For the
first time, it allowed a plaintiff to bring an action for the
entire damage in the country where the damage was suf-
fered. In this case, the plaintiffs had suffered an infringe-
ment of a personality right, and the court accepted that
they bring a claim in respect of the entire damage in the
country where they had ‘the centre of their interests’.63
54 Ibid., para 55.
55 See footnote 59.
56 See footnote 60.
57 See footnote 61.
58 See footnote 74.
59 Judgment in Handelskwekerij Bier v Mines de potasse d’Alsace, 21/76,
EU:C:1976:166, para 19.
60 Judgment in Shevill and v Presse Alliance, C-68/93, EU:C:1995:61.
61 Judgment in eDate Advertising and others, C-509/09 and C-161/10,
EU:C:2011:685.
62 Ibid., para 45–46.
63 Ibid., para 48.
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The court thus nuanced its previous position that claims
for the entire damage should be brought before the
courts of the country of the event giving rise to the
damage or the defendant’s domicile. That connecting
factor was based on the objective of the sound adminis-
tration of justice and on the aim of predictability of the
rules governing jurisdiction.
However, some uncertainty remains regarding the
scope of application of the eDate Advertising decision:
some scholars consider that it is strictly limited to the
protection of personality rights and that does not extend
to the infringement of other kinds of rights (in particular
copyright), while others see an opportunity for more
flexibility.64
Still, the plaintiff has the alternative to sue the person
allegedly liable for the infringing act in the country of
the event giving rise to the damage, or in each country
where the damage occurred. In theory, damage could
occur in every country where the website containing the
infringing article was accessible. So the courts of the
countries where the content is accessible would have
(limited) jurisdiction: every Member State would have
jurisdiction with regard to a part of the damage for the
mere reason that a website was accessible on its territory.
According to E. Treppoz, the criterion of accessibility
might even provide jurisdiction to Member States where
no real prejudice is suffered.65 However, the courts in
these countries would not award any damages, since
their jurisdiction is limited to the harm suffered in their
territory.
In respect of what we observed in the first part of this
article on the localization of acts, we can already observe
a difference. In the context of online infringements the
CJEU localized the relevant acts in the Member States
where the public was targeted and rejected the criterion
of accessibility. Jurisdiction for deciding of infringe-
ments, by contrast, can be established based on the
accessibility of the website. This difference can be
explained by the different objectives of these provisions.
The localisation of a protected act will determine inter
alia for which territories a licence should be obtained.
The criteria to establish jurisdiction may be larger, con-
sidering principles such as the sound administration of
justice. The CJEU also deviated from the criterion of the
‘intention to target’, which it applied in Pammer and
Hotel Alpenhof66 precisely in order to establish jurisdic-
tion. That decision was however based on another provi-
sion (Art 15) of the Brussels I Regulation, which focuses
on the existence of activities directed to a Member State.
That criterion of the directing of activities of the service
provider to a consumer is not mentioned in Article 5(3)
of the Brussels I Regulation, which probably explains the
difference in the application of these provisions.
The Wintersteiger case67 gave the court the opportun-
ity to apply Article 5(3) to online infringing, and delin-
eate the scope of the eDate Advertising doctrine. In this
case, an advertiser based in Germany made unauthorised
use of a trademark registered in Austria, by means of a
web search engine focused on Germany. The court
re-stated the possibility for the holder of a trade mark of
suing the advertiser in the country of the event giving
rise to the infringing act or in the country where the
damage occurs. As to place of the event giving rise to a
damage caused through the use of Internet, the court
rejected the interpretation that this is the place where a
server is installed: the server’s location is uncertain
and would lead to unforeseeable outcomes in terms of
jurisdiction. Instead, the event giving rise to the infringe-
ment of the trademark was described as the ‘activation
by the advertiser of the technical process displaying,
according to pre-defined parameters, the advertisement
which it created for its own commercial communica-
tions’,68 not the display of the advertisement itself. This
event takes place where the activation of the technical
process displaying the infringing content occurs, which
in this case was the place of establishment of the adver-
tiser. It is a definite and identifiable place, and therefore
likely to facilitate the taking of evidence and the conduct
of the proceedings.69 In this case, the action regarding
the alleged trademark infringement by means of key-
words to a search engine could be brought before the
courts of the Member State of the establishment of the
advertiser.
With regard to the criterion of the place where the
damage occurs, the court gave the courts of the Member
State in which the right at issue is registered the jurisdic-
tion to determine whether the right has been infringed
and to assess all the damage allegedly caused to the
proprietor of the protected right. If eDate Advertising
provided an accessibility criterion for establishing juris-
diction, the decision in Wintersteiger imposed a restric-
tion to this approach, which was justified by the fact that
the right at issue (a trademark) has to be registered to
receive protection.
64 JC Ginsburg ‘Where does the act of “making available” occur?’ The Media
Institute (29 October 2012), available at http://www.mediainstitute.org/IPI/
2012/102912.php (last accessed 7 February 2014). See however Treppoz,
above, n 48, 847. See below on the pending preliminary question in Hejduk.
65 Treppoz, above, n 48, 853.
66 See footnote 20.
67 Judgment in Wintersteiger, C-523/10, EU:C:2012:220.
68 Ibid., para 34.
69 Ibid.
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In Pinckney, the Court of Justice applied Article 5(3)
of the Brussels I Regulation to a copyright infringement,
following the claim of a singer-songwriter living in
France, whose songs were reproduced without his
consent on CDs in Austria by an Austrian company.70,71
The CDs were then marketed on the Internet by UK
companies, whose websites were accessible in France.
The songwriter brought proceedings against the Aus-
trian company in France. The defendant challenged the
competence of the French courts and the case was re-
ferred to the CJEU to decide whether France had juris-
diction on the basis of Article 5(3) of the Brussels I
Regulation.
In this case, it was clear that the event giving rise to
the damage had not taken place in France, so it had to be
verified whether this was nonetheless the place where the
damage occurred. The court confirmed the application
of the theory of the accessibility and stated that, contrary
to Article 15 of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 5(3)
does not require the activity to be ‘directed to’ the
Member State in which the court seized is situated. The
CJEU consequently decided that a court has jurisdiction
over a copyright infringement if the Member State in
which that court is situated protects the copyrights
relied on by the plaintiff and that the harmful event
alleged may occur within the jurisdiction of the court
seized. According to the CJEU, ‘that likelihood arises, in
particular from the possibility of obtaining a reproduc-
tion of the work to which the rights relied on by the de-
fendant pertain from a website accessible within the
jurisdiction of the court seised’.72 Nevertheless, the CJEU
reminded that, if the protection granted is applicable
only in that Member State, the court seized on this basis
would only have jurisdiction to determine the damage
caused within the Member State in which it is situated.
Broader jurisdiction allowing a court to decide on the
damage caused in other Member States would imply
that this court could ‘substitute itself for the courts of
those States’, even though these other courts have juris-
diction (in principle, in the light of Article 5(3) of the
Brussels I Regulation and the principle of territoriality)
to determine the damage caused in their respective
Member States, the nature of the harm and they are best
placed to ascertain whether the copyrights protected by
the Member State concerned have been infringed.73,74
Like eDate Advertising, the Pinckney decision departs
from the notion of ‘intention to target’ which was used
as to the localization of the material acts in the decision
Sportradar.
A reference for a preliminary ruling from Austria is
currently pending before the CJEU, concerning the inter-
pretation of Article 5(3) in the context of alleged online
copyright infringements. The background proceedings
related to a dispute between an Austrian photographer
and a German company that operated a website with a
‘.de’ top-level domain on which her photograph was ac-
cessible without her consent. The photographer sued the
German company in Austria because the website was
accessible in Austria, and, based on the principles in
eDate Advertising, she considered that she could choose
whether to bring legal action in the Member State where
the defendant had its establishment (Germany) or in the
Member State where she has the centre of her interests
(Austria). The defendant challenged the jurisdiction of
the Austrian courts and argued that, under Article 5(3),
the courts of the place of upload (Germany) were com-
petent to hear the case. Accessibility, according to the de-
fendant, may only be a criterion for jurisdiction if the
damage occurs on the territory of, and the website is (at
least) directed to, this Member State. The CJEU was
asked to consider whether, under Article 5(3), there
would be jurisdiction only in the Member State in which
the alleged infringer is established and in the Member
States to which the website is directed.75 The answer to
this question will clarify whether mere accessibility of a
website (in Austria) suffices to establish jurisdiction. The
decision is also eagerly awaited, because for the first time
the CJEU will apply Article 5(3) in the context of alleged
infringement of the making-available right.
In summary, it follows from this analysis that a legal
action may always be brought before the courts of the
Member State where the defendant is domiciled (Art 2
70 Judgment in Pinckney, above, n 47.
71 See footnote 49.
72 Ibid., para 44.
73 Ibid.
74 The French Supreme Court has applied the judgment of the CJEU on 22
January 2014: Pinckney v KDG Mediatech, Cass, 22 January 2014.
75 Hejduk, C-441/13, Reference for a preliminary ruling, 11 October 2013.
The question referred:
Is Article 5(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22
December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters to be interpreted as
meaning that, in a dispute concerning an infringement of rights
related to copyright which is alleged to have been committed in that a
photograph was kept accessible on a website, the website being
operated under the top-level domain of a Member State other than
that in which the proprietor of the right is domiciled, there is
jurisdiction only in the Member State in which the alleged infringer is
established; and in the Member State(s) to which the website,
according to its content, is directed?
See ‘Prejudiciële vraag: Rechterlijke bevoegdheid bij topleveldomein van
een andere lidstaat’, IEF 13169 (22 October 2013), with a link to a
translation of the decision of the referring court, available at http://www.ie-
forum.nl/ (last accessed 9 July 2014).
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Brussels I regulation). Complementary to that general
rule, in the context of copyright infringements legal pro-
ceedings may be also brought before the courts of the
Member States where the event giving rise to the damage
takes place or the damage occurs (Art 5(3) Brussels I
Regulation). The courts of the Member State where the
event giving rise to the damage occurs can award the
entire damage, while the courts of the Member States
where the damage is localized will have jurisdiction only
for the damage occurring on their territory. Keeping in
mind the territoriality of copyright, the damage will be
the largest in the Member State where the act is localized
(ie targeting) and the right holder has an interest in
acting in that Member State or, if it is not the same, in
the country where the defendant is domiciled (for effi-
ciency reasons). This does not mean that he/she cannot
act in those Member State where the work is accessible,
but he/she may be acting there for negligible damages.
Even though it may theoretically act in several European
countries, the rightholder should opt either for the
country where the defendant is domiciled (this generally
corresponds to the place where the event giving rise to
the infringement is localized) or for the Member State
targeted by the unauthorized exploitation.
Finding jurisdiction for online exploitation
of works in the EU
It appears, from the brief description of the principles as
interpreted by the CJEU, that the author (or other
holder of a copyright or neighbouring right) can bring
her claim regarding the infringement of her copyright
before the courts of different Member States. The scope
of jurisdiction depends on the legal ground. The courts
of the Member State where the defendant is established
and those of the ‘event giving rise to the damage’ have
jurisdiction for the entire damage suffered by the victim
of the infringement. The courts of the Member States
where the damage occurs have jurisdiction with regard
to the damage caused in that Member State exclusively.
Where the alleged infringement results from un-
authorized use of protected subject matter over the
Internet, the event giving rise to the damage could be the
upload of the subject-matter to a server from where it is
accessible to the public. The act of uploading could take
place in the Member State where the defendant has his/
her domicile or elsewhere, depending on where he/she is
located at the time when he/she makes the subject
matter accessible online.
For online copyright infringements, there remains
some doubt as to the place where the damage occurs,
which the CJEU could solve in Hejduk. If it confirms the
choice made in eDate Advertising and Pinckney, it could
consider that the accessibility of a website in a Member
State provides jurisdiction to the courts of that country
because this accessibility could potentially cause damage
to the rightholder. Such accessibility could suffice, even
if the infringing act is not localized in that country
according to the targeting approach the CJEU applies as
to the localization of the material acts. As a consequence,
the courts of a Member State of access might have juris-
diction to hear a case resulting from a copyright in-
fringement but they would have difficulty to grant
damages if the work is merely accessible. Where the
content provider has made a discernible effort to target
the public residing in a certain Member State, the courts
of that Member State will have jurisdiction and be able
to decide on a larger part of the damages that can be
established.
In the context of the online exploitation of copyright
protected works, we have identified the existence of several
restricted acts: a reproduction on the hosting server (up-
stream copy), an act of making available to the public and
a reproduction at the end user’s device (downstream
copy). If these acts infringe the exclusive rights of the
author, the rules of the Brussels I Regulation may provide
jurisdiction to the courts of different Member States.
According to Article 2, the person liable for the in-
fringement may always be sued in the Member State
where he/she is domiciled. The alleged infringer may be
required to answer for the damage caused by the repro-
duction (upstream and downstream) and the making
available to the public without the rightholder’s consent.
This does not mean that the competent court gets to
apply its own law: it is well possible that the competent
court will have to assess these acts and their infring-
ing character by the law of other Member States (lex loci
protectionis).
Furthermore, the courts of the Member States in
which the events causing the damage take place are com-
petent to decide on the entire damage. Similarly to Win-
tersteiger, these ‘events giving rise to the damage’ could
be the decision of the content provider to make pro-
tected subject matter accessible from a website or some
other online service. It could also be the act of uploading
the files to the server or the material act of making a
copy on a server. A further question is then how the
event giving rise to the damage should be described
where a file is offered for download: should the fact of
the availability for download offered by the content pro-
vider be emphasized or rather the actual download by
the end user? Arguably, either interpretation could
justify the jurisdiction of a court, but any choice thus
operated will have implications for the scope of the juris-
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diction. Finally, the rightholder has the possibility of
bringing legal action before the courts of the Member
States where he/she suffers the consequences of the pre-
ceding ‘event’ and where he/she suffers the damage. Ar-
guably, this could be the Member States where files are
downloaded, ie where the end user makes and stores the
copies of the downloaded files. Where a work is made
available for the end user to access it (streaming), the
damage could occur in every Member State where the
work is accessible. It follows that the courts of all
Member States where the work is accessible online have
jurisdiction, or, in other words, that a court should
decline jurisdiction when the content provider has used
technical means (geoblocking) to prevent people staying
in a particular Member State from accessing the content.
Where a court’s jurisdiction is based on mere accessibil-
ity of a website, it will have a limited margin to award
damages. In our example, a rightholder may seize a Por-
tuguese court for infringement of copyright in her work
(music, film) due to mere accessibility of a website in
Portugal, even if the website is entirely presented in
Hungarian, offers mainly Hungarian films or music and
allows payment only in the Hungarian currency. The
Portuguese court will be able to award limited damages
because the rightholder will have suffered limited
damage in Portugal. The concerned rightholder will be
probably more successful if he/she seizes the Hungarian
courts, even if the content provider is established in
another Member State. The content provider would be
deemed to have organized the offer of the works in such
a way that the Hungarian public is targeted in order to
maximize the commercial return of his/her investment
(eg income from advertisers for the Hungarian market,
paying customers staying in Hungary).
Finding a satisfactory solution
In the first section, this article has recalled the principle
of territoriality of copyright, and examined CJEU case
law localization of protected acts of reproduction, distri-
bution and making available to the public on the terri-
tory of one or more Member States. It was established
that the CJEU started from a technical criterion (the
presence of a broadcasting station on the territory of a
Member State in Lagardère) to a more economic criter-
ion, i.e. the ‘targeting’ of a public within the EU (L’Oréal
v eBay) or within a Member State (Pammer and Hotel
Alpenhof; Donner; Sportradar). In L’Oréal the Court
applied the “targeting” criterion to localise the act
within the EU (as opposed to third countries) and in the
other cited cases this criterion was used to localise the
act in one particular member state. In the context of
online activities, the CJEU stated that mere accessibility
of a website in a Member State is not sufficient to local-
ize the relevant act there. This localization criterion was
often connected to a question on jurisdiction but it
could also clarify whether there was an infringement of a
territorial intellectual property right (a community
trademark in L0Oréal v eBay and copyright in Donner).
In the second section, the rules establishing jurisdic-
tion according to the Brussels I Regulation were analysed
together with relevant CJEU decisions. Starting from
the general principle that the defendant might be sued
before the courts of the Member State where he/she has
his/her domicile and where the claimant could claim
compensation for the entire damage, we have also dis-
cussed the possibility of initiating proceedings before a
court in the Member State where the harmful event oc-
curred. The CJEU has interpreted this criterion as
meaning the courts of the Member State of the event
giving rise to the damage or the Member State(s) where
the damage occurred or may occur. The choice of one or
the other criterion is not irrelevant: the court of the
place where the event occurred is competent to decide
on the entire damage (regardless of where the damage
occurred or may occur), while the courts of the place of
the damage can only rule on the damage occurred or
occurring on the territory of their Member State.
It seems then that accessibility of a website is a necessary
condition for establishing jurisdiction but accessibility
alone does not guarantee a satisfactory treatment of the
case from the rightholder’s perspective because the court’s
jurisdiction is restricted to the damage arising in that
Member State. From a practical standpoint, it should be
first ascertained whether the level of the damage in the
Member State of accessibility would justify the cost and
burden of litigation. The most obvious option is then to
seize the court of the Member State where the public is tar-
geted and where the exploitation of the work can be estab-
lished. The ‘targeting’ of a public in a Member State may
not be a condition for jurisdiction, but in practice it will
allow the rightholder to claim compensation for an im-
portant part of his/her alleged damage. This criterion
would be a natural choice for the content provider, whose
intentions and efforts to establish a large audience are de-
cisive for establishing the ‘targeting’ of a local public. Even
if there is no formal criterion that imposes a choice for the
courts of the Member State where the public is targeted, it
seems that in practice this offers most chances of a satisfac-
tory treatment of an online copyright infringement claim.
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